"I supported the war in Iraq" says Michael Fabricant "but the Prime
Minister’s claims and counter-claims about the ’45 minute warning’ make a
mockery of life and death for our soldiers and those of Iraqis."

The facts so far:-

24 September 2002
The Government publishes its September dossier.
The Prime Minister’s foreword to the dossier states that Saddam Hussein’s:
‘military planning allows for some of the WMD to be ready within 45 minutes
of an order to use them’.

24 September 2002
The Prime Minister says in the House of Commons: ‘[The dossier makes clear
that] Iraq has chemical and biological weapons, that Saddam has continued to
produce them, that he has existing and active military plans for the use of
chemical and biological weapons, which could be activated within 45 minutes.

24 September 2002
The Evening Standard headline reads ’45 MINUTES FROM ATTACK’

25 September 2002
The Sun headline reads ‘BRITS 45 MINS FROM DOOM’ and claims that WMD could
be fired at British troops in Cyprus.

5 March 2003
Robin Cook talks to the Prime Minister. According to his book: ‘The most
revealing exchange came when we talked about Saddam’s arsenal. I told him:
"It’s clear from the private briefing that I have had that Saddam has no
weapons of mass destruction in a sense of weapons that could strike at
strategic cities. But he probably does have several thousand battlefield
chemical munitions. Do you never worry that he might use them against
British troops?"

The Prime Minister says in reply ‘Yes, but all the effort he has had to put
into concealment makes it difficult for him to assemble them quickly for
use’ (Robin Cook, The Point of Departure, 2003).

18 March 2003
Robin Cook resigns.

18 March 2003
When asked in the House of Commons [on 4 February 2004] when he knew that
the 45 minute claim related to battlefield weapons or small calibre
weaponry, the Prime Minister said ‘it was not before the debate on 18 March
last year’.

18 March 2003
Parliament debates the case for war and votes in favour of military action.

9 September 2003
The Intelligence and Security Committee reports.
It concludes ‘the context of the intelligence on the 45 minutes claim should
have been explained, in particular the fact that it was assessed to refer to
battlefield chemical and biological munitions and their movement on the
battlefield, not to any other form of chemical or biological attack, should
have been highlighted in the dossier. The omission of this context and
assessment allowed speculation as to its exact meaning.’

22 September 2003
Geoff Hoon is cross-examined at the Hutton Inquiry. He confirms that he knew
45 minutes did not refer to long-range weapons of mass destruction. Jeremy
Gompertz (Counsel for the Kelly family): ‘Was there any other suggestion
that they were not battlefield munitions but strategic munitions?’ Geoff
Hoon: ‘I recall asking what kind of weapons would be deployable within 45
minutes; and the answer is the answer that I have just given to you.’
Gompertz: ‘Which was shells, battlefield mortars, tactical weapons of that
kind?’
Hoon: ‘Yes.’

22 September 2003
Mr Hoon is asked at the Hutton Inquiry: ‘Are you aware that on the 25th of
September a number of newspapers had banner headlines suggesting that this
related to strategic missiles or bombs?’
He replies: ‘I can recall, yes.’

28 September 2003
David Blunkett reveals that the 45 minute claim was not discussed by the
Cabinet. ‘Did the defence secretary, did any of us raise the forty five
minutes when we were discussing the dossier?’ ‘I’ve already explained we
didn’t, no’ (Dimbleby Programme, 28 September 2003).

4 February 2004
Robin Cook disputes the Prime Minister’s claim [in the same debate of 4
February 2004] that the Prime Minister did not know that the 45 minute claim
related to battlefield weapons or small calibre weaponry.
Robin Cook said: ‘I am bound to say that I am surprised by that answer. In
my resignation speech I did make the very point that we were considering
battlefield weapons and that Saddam probably had no real weapons of mass
destruction. I find it difficult to reconcile what I knew and what I am sure
the Prime Minister knew at the time we had the vote in March.’

4 February 2004
Geoff Hoon tells the House of Commons that he only investigated the nature
of the weapons in the 45 minute claim ‘out of curiosity’.

5 February 2004
Geoff Hoon appears on the Today Programme.
He is asked when he first saw the forty-five minute claim had become a
matter of public interest, when for example he had seen The Sun headline on
the day the dossier was published in September; the headline that read,
Forty-five Minutes from Doom. He replies: ‘The first time I saw that
headline was very recently watching a Panorama programme [21 January 2004]
that flashed up the front page of The Sun on the screen, and that was the
very first time I had ever seen that particular publication.

5 February 2004
Mr Hoon appears on BBC Breakfast.
He is asked ‘we know you like correcting falsehoods in the media, why didn’t
you get on to the Editor of The Sun or whatever paper it was in and say
look, this is wrong, they couldn’t possibly hit London with this weaponry?’
He replies ‘Well I didn’t actually see that newspaper or indeed any other
newspaper referring to that issue at the time.’ NB. Compare with the
evidence that he gave to the Hutton Inquiry on 22 September 2003.

5 February 2004
Geoff Hoon appears before the Defence Select Committee.
Mr Hoon reveals that he did not discuss the 45 minute claim with the Prime
Minister. ‘It was not a matter that we discussed’ (Press Association, 5
February 2004).

5 February 2004
Robin Cook says in the House of Commons that his information about
battlefield munitions came from the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence
Committee. He says that it is difficult to explain why Sir David Manning
[PM’s Security Advisor] never thought to ask to what the 45 minute claim
referred.